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The ‘Roma Problem’ in the EU 
Nomadism, (in)visible architectures and violence 
Anca Pusca 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
This article argues that the ‘Roma problem’ in the EU is often 
translated into a ‘space problem’. The targeting of Roma spaces—
camps, right to movement, Roma homes and palaces—ultimately 
challenges the Roma’s right to settlement and insures their invisibility. 
By turning its attention to the recent politics of Roma expulsions in 
France, this article seeks to better understand their implications by 
looking at: a) the relationship between the Roma’s sedentary vs. 
nomadic lifestyle; b) the Roma’s use of space to secure both visibility 
and invisibility; and c) the state’s problematic use of legal violence in 
order to control and police the Roma. The article strongly suggests 
that the Roma ‘space problem’ cannot be solved by attempts to either 
construct (settlement) or constrict (expulsion) Roma spaces by an 
outside authority, but rather through an acceptance of Roma’s 
temporary presence—even if it involves a long-term temporality—in 
camps ‘abroad’ and continued support for Roma communities ‘at 
home’. 
 
Introduction 
This article seeks to address the so-called ‘Roma problem’ in the EU 
by looking at the ways in which what is ultimately an economic and 
legal discrimination problem gets translated into a ‘space’ problem: 
expulsion from ‘camps’, rejection of ‘nomadism’ and the Roma’s right 
to free movement as EU citizens and, more recently, increased 
fetishization of Roma palaces throughout Romania. By targeting the 
very ‘space’ that the Roma occupy—whether it be the camps that they 
live in ‘abroad’, their movement across borders or their homes and 
palaces—the more recent policies of expulsion in France and Italy, 
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but also continued policies of discrimination throughout the EU, are in 
fact targeting the Roma’s right to settle, anywhere. If Romanians and 
Bulgarians were glad to see the Roma move abroad, their host 
countries are equally anxious to see them go ‘home’.  
By examining a) the relationship between the Roma’s sedentary vs. 
nomadic lifestyle; b) the Roma’s use of space to secure both visibility 
and invisibility; and c) the state’s problematic use of legal violence in 
order to control and police the Roma, this article argues that potential 
solutions to the ‘Roma problem’ need to ultimately address the ‘space 
problem’ and accept the Roma’s right to settle on their own terms, 
without attempts to either forcefully construct (Roma camps, Roma 
blocks of flats, Roma neighbourhoods) or constrict (expulsion, 
segregation, legal infringement) the spaces that they inhabit. If one 
dares to accept the ‘Roma problem’ as not much different from the 
problem of other economic migrants, then perhaps more patience, 
tolerance and time would provide a more acceptable long-term 
solution. Instead, the status quo appears to be dominated by quick fix 
policies that are doomed to fail.  
Assessing the ‘Roma Problem’ in the EU Today 
As of August 2010, more than 40 Roma camps throughout France 
have been dismantled, with over 700 residents scheduled to be 
returned to Romania and Bulgaria by the end of September 
(Associated Press 2010). After a similar move in Italy two years ago, 
France, which originally opposed Italy’s attempt at the time to change 
EU legislation to allow the forceful repatriation of EU citizens, seems 
to have changed its mind (Plesa 2010). As EU members such as Italy, 
France, Germany, Austria, and Spain are getting increasingly 
frustrated with the socio-economic ‘burden’ that Roma migration puts 
on them, short-term solutions are becoming increasingly aggressive in 
spite of the historically proven inefficiency of their tactics.  
As police presence and surveillance technologies are stepped up, 
improvements to current policies are based on attempts to better 
monitor the identity of the repatriated Roma—through fingerprinting—
with the clear hope that future EU policies might allow for prosecution 
or tighter control over the movement of certain EU citizens. Although 
the EU has officially criticized both Italy and France for their forceful 
displacement of EU citizens, it has yet to take legal action against 
further displacements. While Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of 
the European Commission, has threatened Paris with legal action if 
expulsions continue, his threat appears to have only emboldened 
Nikolas Sarkozy, the French President, who vowed to continue the 
expulsions as France’s legal sovereign right (Castle & Bennhold 
2010).  
The comments by EU justice commissioner Vivienne Reding that 
compared the French Roma expulsions to Nazi ethnic cleansing have 
continued to inflame the situation, despite being met with some 
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reproach by other EU members, such as the UK, which cautioned 
against the use of such extreme parallels. The French president 
rebuffed the comments by saying that Angela Merkel had personally 
suggested during a recent meeting that Roma camps in Germany will 
soon be dismantled as well (Dempsey & Castle 2010). German 
ministers have since dismissed any such statement, although it is not 
entirely unlikely that Merkel would have informally supported the 
French actions and acknowledged a similar problem within her own 
borders.    
As Tara Bedard of the European Roma Rights Center in Budapest 
argues, all this has however served to bring the ‘Roma problem’ to the 
forefront of the EU agenda, albeit perhaps not in the most positive 
manner (cited in Laurence 2010). No agreement has however been 
reached at EU meetings as of September 2010, with the French 
president determined to continue the expulsions and the EU 
Commission president unlikely to act on his threat for legal action. 
Solutions are likely to involve either an increase in aid for the Roma in 
Romania and Bulgaria or better management of how the money 
currently allocated is being spent, as well as increased pressures for 
better Roma integration and settlement policies in these two 
countries.  
In a tightening economic climate in which the Romanian government 
has just cut the salaries of all government employees by 25% and 
clamped down on all social benefits, this is not likely to go down well. 
Further aid targeting the Roma in particular will only result in 
increased resentment and violence against the Roma, which will be 
perceived as gaining undeserved privileges. Pressures for a legal 
solution to the ‘problem’ are also not likely to go unheard on either 
side: while the EU may try to establish further legal guarantees of the 
right to free movement in its member states—forcing perhaps France 
to write the 2004 directive this into its national law—it may also cede 
to some of France’s demands and establish more clear legal 
repercussions for those ‘EU residents’ who become an unfair 
economic burden.  
In an attempt to appease the situation, the Romanian government is 
promising to make available Romanian police forces in France—as 
they did two years ago in Italy—in order to help with the tracking and 
repatriation process (Plesa 2010). All sides recognize however the 
short-term nature of these interventions, with over two thirds of those 
displaced in the past having already returned to new camps within 
France and Italy. Interviews with some of the Roma that just landed in 
Romania after the latest round of expulsions, reveal that many of 
them will return to France before the winter (Vidican 2010). With no 
jobs or houses of their own and promises of better fortunes abroad, 
there is little incentive to stay, especially as the process of 
marginalization intensifies within Romania as well (Davies 2010).  
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The ‘Roma Problem’ as Unique?  
Despite Romanian and Bulgarian Roma often being singled out, 
studies show that ‘not only are there striking similarities in the socio-
demographic profiles of Romani and non-Romani migrants, but that 
the migratory routes of the two groups are very similar as well’ 
(Sobotka 2003, p. 92). The Roma experience of post-communism has 
been in many ways not much different from that of other poor and 
marginalized Romanians: with many families forced to abandon their 
city accommodations and join extended families in rural areas due to 
the loss of jobs, the tighter Roma community has been slowly 
disintegrating, resulting in the emergence of ‘new forms of power, 
influence and (dis)trust’ (Pantea 2009, p. 28).  
It should perhaps not be surprising then that desperate Roma and 
Romanian families would resort to desperate solutions: including 
trafficking, forced child labour and stealing. Yet if some of this 
behaviour becomes understandable if not tolerable when it comes to 
Romanians (and Bulgarians) under the aegis of the ‘transition from 
communism’ discourse, the same is not the case for Roma 
communities from Romania and Bulgaria. For them, such behaviour is 
no longer understood as connected to a wider socio-political 
transformation—the ‘transition’—but rather to some kind of ‘innate’ 
attribute that has historically exhibited the same problems.  
Given the wide exposure that the Roma issue has received 
throughout the EU through the rise of different Roma civil rights 
groups, it is unclear whether the singling out of the Roma 
communities in Italy and France is truly a ‘Roma problem’ or whether 
the ‘Roma problem’ is being used as an excuse to perhaps deal with 
the wider East-West migration within the EU—largely perceived now 
as the ‘Romanian and Bulgarian problem’. Whichever is the case, for 
now at least, the ‘scapegoats’ remain the same. It is important 
however to recognize the ‘Roma problem’ as unique not so much in 
terms of its causes but rather in terms of its labelling. By labelling the 
‘Roma problem’ as a ‘unique problem’ both France and Italy are doing 
nothing but reinforcing narratives that the Romanian (and presumably 
the Bulgarian) government have been employing for years. Looking to 
these same governments for solutions sends a clear message: ‘The 
Roma mess is yours, deal with it.’  
Who the ‘Roma problem’ belongs to brings us back to the idea of the 
‘problem’ as mainly a ‘spatial’ one. Belonging, in this case, is clearly 
understood in terms of a set spatial border which delimits not so much 
an identity as a responsibility. Space, in this case national space—
encompassing the Romanian and Bulgarian borders vs. the wider EU 
borders—denotes a sense of sovereign control and enforcement 
which is clearly limited by borders. Italy’s and France’s current politics 
of expulsion point out that the guaranteed ‘freedom of movement’ 
within the EU is in fact limited by the individual sovereign states 
continued responsibility for their citizens. Just like the Roma are ‘free’ 
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to move to other parts of the EU, the Romanian and Bulgarian police 
are also ‘free’ to control them outside of the Romanian and Bulgarian 
borders. Control, in this case, appears as the other side of freedom.   
Questioning Roma Nomadism 
The romantic idea of Roma nomadism, often fetishized in ‘gypsy films’ 
such as Tony Gatlif’s or Emir Kusturica’s (Dobreva 2007), has been 
regularly challenged in the Roma rights literature which argues 
instead that the present condition of the Roma is ‘adaptable out of 
necessity, itinerant out of lack of alternatives more than by choice’ 
(Orta 2010, p. 12). The nomadism of ‘travellers’ is, for the most part, a 
thing of the past, with current nomadism fitting closely into the regular 
migration patterns of other Romanian and Bulgarian citizens looking 
for opportunities abroad. Continued cultural and political tendencies to 
aestheticize and fetishize the Roma contribute to the formation of 
particular stereotypes that are to be admired and even envied on 
film—for their perceived freedom and carefree lifestyle—yet dismissed 
and resented in reality. This, as Sigona explains, leads to a situation 
where the ‘Roma do not exist as personae for the majority of Italians 
but only as stereotypes’ (Sigona 2005, p. 747). As Fonseca argues 
‘The more exotic Gypsies appear to be, the more “genuine” they are 
considered and, paradoxically, the more acceptable they become’ 
(Fonseca quoted in Sigona 2005, p. 747).   
‘The Roma’, a homogeneous label that often fails to grasp the 
significant cultural, religious, linguistic and economic differences that 
exist between different groups (Klimova 2002), exist as a unified entity 
either in their status of fetishized Roma or in their status of ‘enemy’ 
(Sigona 2005, p. 747). This sometimes positive, sometimes negative 
identity appears to also correspond to the spatial location of the 
Roma: when far away, they can be easily romanticized, when close 
by, they become the enemy. The Roma camps thus become the 
ultimate enemy territory, enforcing a separation between the Roma 
and the rest of society, with the Roma inhabiting the urban fringes of 
often abandoned terrain, vulnerable both in front of the law as well as 
local violence. As Sigona explains, once located within the camp, 
independent of their proximity to other local groups, the Roma’s 
relational space is constricted by an invisible border that makes 
contact between groups living in the same community almost 
impossible (Sigona 2005, p. 750). 
Their location within the camp not only makes their demands appear 
illegitimate but also turns their judicial precariousness into existential 
precariousness (Sigona 2005, p. 751).  The ‘nomadic’ label often 
attached directly to Roma camps—the Italians call them ‘nomadic 
camps’—thus serves to justify dismantling as both a legal response—
the state/law does not tolerate nomadism in the form of illegal 
temporary settlements—but also a cultural one—if they are nomads, 
settling can and should only be acceptable temporarily. It is the 
Roma’s physical presence in the camps that makes them much more 
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vulnerable to the law than other ‘nomadic’ groups such as foreign 
workers. And yet their presence there is encouraged and shunned at 
the same time.  
At the time of writing this, while some Roma are forced out of their 
settlements in France they are welcomed into others, with the local 
governments rushing to provide running water, toilets and basic 
infrastructure to support the incoming ‘residents’. This apparent 
contradiction in policies does not appear to be unique to France, for 
camps are ultimately seen as the preferable temporary solution by 
many ‘host’ states: as long as the Roma are in a camp, they can be 
easily targeted and ‘dealt with’ at any point in time. Once integrated 
into the local community and living in ‘flats’—even when those flats 
are provided by the local governments—the Roma become less 
traceable and are invariably perceived as less of a threat.  
A case in point is Iancu Petru, a Romanian Roma who left the Roma 
camp to settle into the prefabricated village provided by the French 
authorities at Aubervilliers near Paris, learned French and started 
sending his children to French schools. His parents, still living in a 
nearby camp, are threatened with expulsion at any point, while he is 
now considered a legal resident (Staff Writer 2010). As it appears, the 
line between settling and nomadism is indeed very thin, often drawn 
on the basis of one’s presence in a camp or a ‘prefabricated’ village. 
The rule appears to be: the more ‘temporary’ the structure the more 
‘nomadic’ its inhabitants, independent of whether the inhabitants have 
a choice over the nature of the structure or not.  
Just as Roma music, dancing and fashion are often fetishized in the 
movies, Roma architecture has itself become the target of fetishism. 
Lamenting that ‘architects dream of nomadism, but build permanence’ 
(Project 35 Architects 2010, p. 43) (post)modern architecture has 
often looked at Roma ‘nomadic’ lifestyle for inspiration. The 
Situationalists have long defended Roma nomadism and been 
inspired by Roma unusual use of outdoor/indoor space to 
create/imagine future cities and living quarters (Wollen 2001, p. 124). 
Architects like Pinot Gallizio, George Candilis and Constant 
Nieuwenhuys imagined the Roma to be the precursors of future world 
nomadism where nomadic camps would become the norm for world 
travellers.  
Constant’s celebrated New Babylon project—a city to be inhabited by 
transients only—plays to early attempts to glorify nomadism and the 
perceived freedom inherent in the nomadic lifestyle. The nomadic 
experience is often celebrated as ‘a challenge [to] some of the 
foundations of Western civilisation and our entrenched views and 
categorizations’ and a way of living that can inspire the construction of 
trans-national communities (Tzirtzilakis 2010, p. 14). Yet, this 
imagined architecture, something that Svetlana Boym labelled as ‘off-
modern’, serves to further fetishize a Roma nomadic lifestyle that is 
often not a choice but a necessity. In fact, a majority of the Roma 
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today are settled, while the ‘nomadic’ ones often state their main goal 
to be to make enough money to settle (Vidican 2010).  
The idea of nomadism as a form of autonomy and resistance to state 
control is particularly appealing for different critics of the state. 
However, fetishizing nomadism in relation to a particular group, such 
as the Roma, can be dangerous, risking entrenching a negative 
stereotype that often carries with it violent consequences. Fighting for 
nomadism as a right should not be mistaken for fighting for Roma’s 
right to nomadism, as Roma’s presence in ‘nomadic’ camps 
throughout Italy and France is certainly not an expression of their 
freedom and autonomy, but quite the opposite, of their vulnerability.  
While the fetishism of Roma nomadism can in itself be dangerous, 
this is not to say that the question of nomadism as ‘the right to belong 
to a society, and not to belong to it at the same time’ (Orta 2010, p. 
11) is not an interesting one. The challenge of choosing to belong on 
one’s own terms appears ultimately to be a legal one, although its 
expression is often spatial: belonging to the modern nation is 
expressed through a residency status that is connected to the person 
inhabiting a particular space a majority of the time. That space 
signifies the state’s ultimate power to regulate the individual: it is the 
space where one can be found and investigated, counted and taxed, 
surveilled and sent back to. By definition, a nomadic residence is 
unstable, creating significant challenges for the state’s ultimate control 
mechanism.  
The celebration of the new jet-set lifestyle is not a celebration of 
nomadism as such, but rather, a celebration of economic well-being, 
for even the jet-setters ultimately claim residence in a particular place, 
pay taxes and fall under the legal umbrella of a particular state. The 
nomadism that resists state control is hardly a status that many 
desire, for gaining a legal status through settlement is what secures 
access to state services. As such, most ‘nomadic’ groups fight for the 
right to settle—even if temporarily—precisely to gain access to such 
services. The trick then is to secure ways of access to such services 
while at the same time limiting the state’s ability to control you.  
This is perhaps where at least some of the Roma struggle can be 
identified: benefit theft, multiple residencies, fake ID’s/passports, fake 
names. It is unclear however the extent to which this struggle to 
escape control while maintaining access to services is a result of the 
Roma fight for ‘autonomy’ as opposed to an instinctive protective 
mechanism derived from a historical track-record of being 
discriminated against. As Lucy Orta explains:  
The concrete reality experienced by the Roma in most European 
countries speaks however of a tragic paradox: that of a people who 
are not allowed to take root and who are instead forced to live upon 
the discards of non-nomadic citizens, often refused a stable and 
regular lifestyle; but at the same time they are hindered in their 
movement. (Orta 2010, p. 11)  
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This is indeed the real struggle of many of the Roma people today: 
often refused the right to settle, they are also refused the right to 
move. Attempts to settle them are often half-hearted, within improper 
accommodations and without additional support services that would 
provide incentives to stay put. The response to the ‘Roma problem’ 
has indeed mainly focused on two solutions: either settlement or 
forced displacement. If displacement only pushes the ‘problem’ into 
other areas, attempts of settlement are always inevitably done on the 
cheap, providing only temporary and often inefficient solutions. Worse 
of all, the settlement is almost never driven by the communities 
involved but rather by government agencies. Indeed the most 
successful examples of settlement and integration are those where 
the families/communities were able to build their own spaces. 
Perhaps one of the most striking examples of this are the Roma 
castles in Romania. This newly constructed Roma architecture 
establishes a new regime of visibility in which the Roma communities 
can, for the first time, dictate the way in which they are going to be 
seen. Controversial due to their size and intricate aesthetics, the 
Roma castles send nonetheless a clear message that the Roma are 
ready to be seen on their own terms: not only as a victimized group 
that has been historically discriminated against, but also as a 
potentially successful one.  
(In)Visible Architectures 
The Roma camps are ultimately terrains of invisibility. As Fabrizio 
Floris explains ‘the principle characteristic of these settlements is not 
poverty, violence, unemployment, or even architectural decay. Their 
fundamental characteristic is their invisibility’ (Floris 2010, p. 55). 
Pushed literally to the edge of society, the Roma camps are often 
surrounded by fences that seek to physically separate them from the 
surrounding local communities. The presence of the camps is 
tolerated only as long as the invisibility is maintained. It is not 
surprising then that the dismantling of the camps often comes at times 
where the increasing visibility of the Roma gains negative 
connotations: often a crime committed by a member of the group.  
Unlike the Roma caravans of the past, the Roma camps of today 
maintain little of the aesthetic appeal of the former. Makeshift homes 
in the camp are rarely decorated maintaining a purely functional, yet 
temporary style. Put together within a matter of days, the homes come 
apart just as easily. While the inside of the camp homes is intensely 
colourful (Orta 2010) and decorative, it remains invisible to the outside 
world. The camp, as Mariana Celac explains, is not a place where one 
can find:  
a wealth of exotic folklore, a quest for identity or regional 
expression … The new urban poverty is uniform, non-specific, 
highly banal, and non-ethnic. The determinants that bring ghetto 
people together are always similar: being born in a ghetto, having 
been left out in the process of economic restructuring and pushed 
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into poverty by a consumerist and segregative urban society. 
(Celac 2010, p. 101)  
While alternatives to the camp often translate into ‘box-like blocs of 
minimal flats or monotonous aseptic alignments of identical pavilions’ 
(Celac 2010, p. 101) a new type of Roma architecture is on the rise 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe. These striking Roma palaces 
show a remarkable vitality of creativity, expression and identity: 
‘gigantic houses, with their unmistakeable stylistic features: roofs with 
turrets and overlapping cornicing, a vague mix of Chinese pagodas 
and the gingerbread palaces of Bollywood melodrama’ (Andresoiu 
2008, Preface). Funded mainly through remittances from abroad 
these palaces function as intricate displays of wealth that are not 
uncommon amongst groups that have recently come into money 
(Petcut 2008).  
Each palace has a meaning of its own, made in the image of its 
creator, a collection of decorative and architectural fairytales mixed 
with coded messages that symbolize the owner’s source of wealth 
and oftentimes their actual trajectory during the foreign travels that 
allowed them to gather such wealth: Mercedes and dollar signs, lions, 
stags, even a model of the Brandenburg Gate. The roofs often list the 
family names of their inhabitants, and decorative elements such as 
exterior stairs, terraces, turrets or new tiling are constantly added and 
changed in an effort to maintain visibility and compete with 
neighbouring palaces.  
Although imposing in their appearance, many of the palaces are not 
professionally built, often supported by a weak foundation that is not 
able to withhold the many structural additions tacked on in time. A 
majority of the palaces thus often appear unfinished, constant 
construction sites that risk suffering significant setbacks as parts of 
them collapse while others are added. The fragility of these castles 
defies the stability and longevity that most buildings aspire to, baffling 
architects who are growing increasingly interested in them. It is clear 
that this new kind of Roma architecture is something ‘new’, defiant of 
previously established architectural categories. As Mariana Celac 
beautifully writes:  
Their penetrating spirit, dynamism, cumulative expressivity, the 
numerous challenges they pose, the attraction for distinctive 
features of various sources, the vitality and the large sums invested 
together with a social success that exceeds ethnic boundaries, the 
territorial dispersion and critical mass achieved—all these together 
have removed the kastell from under the sign of the picturesque. 
Kastells are supported by a substratum that can be compared, 
metaphorically speaking, with that which facilitated the journey of 
Jazz from the margins to a sub-species of high music with equal 
rights: hunger for identity, irreverence for what went before and 
authority, but an active mimetic spirit, freedom to take control over 
anything that can be used to realise your own design, the capacity 
to resonate with a growing audience, but also exclusion, sarcasm 
and negative publicity—as a vulgar, aesthetically crude, anti-
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cultural phenomenon. All with the advantages of uproar as a 
vehicle of fame. (Celac 2008)  
While Celac’s optimism is infectious, it marks perhaps the perspective 
of an architect discovering a radically new approach to ‘settlement’. 
The reality of the economic crisis, slow growth at home and abroad 
has however clearly caught up with even the wealthy Roma 
communities, leaving an increasing number of their palaces 
unfinished or in decay (Davies 2010). The ultimate expression of post-
1989 capitalist growth mixed with a unique desire to reshape and 
control the way in which their community becomes visible, these 
castles could easily be seen as ‘the symbolic expression of a minority 
group’s search for legitimacy’ (Stefan 2008). How successful this new 
visibility has been remains to be seen.  
If anything however, this newborn Roma architecture has established 
a clear terrain of social visibility under which the Roma were able to 
impose their own vision of themselves and their post-1989 
experience. As Petre Petcut argues: if ‘the ability to switch between 
social visibility and invisibility was the main weapon wielded by 
nomads faced with constant controls by local and national authorities’, 
today this has given way to a permanent visibility (Petcut 2008), 
perhaps a sign of a fearless defiance that clearly states: we are, and 
have been, here to stay and the sooner you acknowledge our 
presence, the better.  
This increased visibility remains however, in many ways, guarded by 
a highly selective access to the inside of these palaces. Two recent 
collections of photographs: Renata Calzi, Patrizio Corno and Carlo 
Gianferro’s Gypsy Architecture and Igloo Patrimoniu Press’s Kastello 
offer for the first time a view of the inside of the palaces and a glimpse 
of the lifestyle of an otherwise very private group of people. The 
grandiose rooms are for the most part sparsely furnished and hardly 
ever used, with the outdoors space continuing to play the most 
important role in the life of the family. The inside space, like the 
facades, is for the most part used to make a statement as opposed to 
actually ‘house’ the family. The Roma remain closely guarded despite 
their increased visibility. Perhaps what the castles—facades and 
interiors—provide is a sense of visibility that does not necessarily 
increase their vulnerability. They are a clear sign of their desire to 
establish their own terrain not only of visibility but also of degree and 
way of settlement.  
Critique of Violence 
The latest round of violence against the Roma through the wide-
spread evacuations from France infringe precisely on the Roma’s right 
to decide where and how to settle. France seeks to give legitimacy to 
their actions through the invocation of EU law, in particular the 
limitations to freedom of movement within the EU as laid out in 
Directive 2004/38/EC (European Commission 2010), turning a 
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fundamental EU right—the freedom of movement—into a legal 
limitation. Violent discrimination becomes protected here by a law that 
apparently seeks to protect the complete freedom of movement of 
those with the necessary economic means while offering grounds for 
legal removal of those who do not. Despite a vehement defence of the 
right of all EU citizens to free movement, France is doing nothing but 
expose and exploit the potential violent consequences of this law, 
which, while granting the right to free movement, closely limits and 
monitors the right to settle.  
The fine print on the EU’s 2004 directive that secures freedom of 
movement for EU citizens throughout the EU lists a series of 
important restrictions and responsibilities, including the right to settle 
for longer than three months in another EU state only if one can prove 
that they can support themselves without the help of the state. This 
presumably implies that they can support themselves to a standard of 
living that is acceptable to the state in question.  If they fail to do so, 
which I suspect most economic migrants do at one point or another, 
then they can be refused residence/right to settle, which presumably 
includes the right to be expelled. It is on these legal grounds that 
France is justifying the current ‘voluntary expulsions’.  
Placing legal limitations on freedom of movement and freedom to 
settle have historically turned sour, and perhaps the 1968 Caravan 
Sites Act in the UK is a good precedent to consider. While it 
established the first legal precedent for acceptance of nomadism as 
legitimate cultural practice, it also limited this practice to authorized 
sites. This limitation effectively allowed the law to be used to evict 
Roma caravans from ‘unauthorized’ sites, control and limit their 
movement, while at the same time weakening the members of the 
caravans by cutting off their source of livelihood by limiting their routes 
and by forcing them into (in)visible authorized sites. The 1994 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which effectively reversed the 
1968 Act—by removing the UK government’s duty to provide caravan 
sites and increasing the state’s power to evict ‘illegal settlers’, thus 
effectively criminalizing the nomadic way of life—served as a reminder 
of the kind of violence that a legal double standard through limitations 
can inflict (Sandland 1996).  
Inflicting violence in the name of law is certainly not new, for as Walter 
Benjamin argues, all aspects of the law—both law-making and law-
preserving—are inherently violent. According to Benjamin, the state, 
as sovereign, has always sought to use the law both to establish itself 
as a legitimate ruler as well as to preserve its power in the face of 
constant challenges (Benjamin 1968). While the legal violence of the 
post WWI German state, the context in which Benjamin was writing, is 
certainly much different from the double standard of the EU’s 
guaranteed, yet limited, freedom of movement, the consequences, 
particularly with regards to the Roma, are equally worrisome.  
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France, through its actions, is doing nothing but expose and exploit 
the double standard of the ‘guarantee’ of freedom of movement within 
the EU, in which settlement is only to be granted on the basis of a net 
economic contribution to the place of settlement. By distinguishing the 
‘freedom of movement’ from the ‘freedom to settle’, the law is clearly 
distinguishing the burden of rights and responsibilities, with the ‘home’ 
state ultimately continuing to carry the responsibility for its 
‘economically challenged’ citizens. This becomes even clearer in light 
of recent requests that the French authorities have placed with the 
European Commission that the Romanian state be responsible for 
‘settling’ and better ‘integrating’ the Roma within Romania by making 
better use of EU funds and offering each Roma family money to set 
up a business (Crisan 2010). The writing between the lines could not 
be more obvious: the EU should pay to incentivize the Roma to settle 
in Romania as opposed to France.  
And yet the freedom of movement within the EU has and continues to 
be utilized by a majority of EU citizens living outside of their home 
state as a means to better their economic situation and maximize 
access to jobs and opportunities. The freedom of movement is 
ultimately a freedom to pursue economic opportunities at all ends of 
the spectrum. If Romanian and Bulgarian citizens are legally allowed 
and encouraged to come pick strawberries, care for the elderly and 
clean the houses of their wealthier EU compatriots, then at least they 
should be respected for their willingness to work under difficult 
conditions in order to improve the economic situation of their families 
and their children. The logic that the same right should not apply to 
the Roma for the simple fact that they are not trusted enough to be 
given access to even the most menial jobs is ultimately embedded in 
a wider distrust in the Roma ability to ever ‘integrate’ or ‘settle’.  
If the EU has chosen to make available a decent proportion of its 
budget—through the European Social Fund, the European Regional 
and Development Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development—to tackling the question of Roma settlement and Roma 
integration, it is unclear why this money should target the settlement 
of the Roma community in particular countries as opposed to others. If 
one is to believe both the political, legal and moral discourse of the 
EU, the ‘Roma problem’ is not a Romanian, Bulgarian, French or 
Italian ‘problem’, but rather an EU one, which means both rights and 
responsibilities are to be equally shared, and the Roma should be free 
to choose where and how they want to be ‘settled’ and ‘integrated’.  
At the risk of being called an optimist, perhaps with a little bit of 
patience, a little less discrimination, more job opportunities and 
access to state services, this ‘problem’ would solve itself the same 
way other economic problems within the EU have solved 
themselves—see the Irish or Spanish or even Italian migration to 
wealthier parts of the EU. While identifying the vulnerabilities of 
particular groups and minorities is important, singling out the Roma as 
a unique ‘problem’ group also makes them more vulnerable in front of 
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the law. EU policies targeting the Roma need to be particularly careful 
at not separating Roma rights from the rights of other EU citizens, 
according them a unique status under the law. The current ‘voluntary 
evacuations’ are moving in the dangerous direction of seeking 
concrete enforcement powers to current limitations to the freedom of 
movement in the EU, something that can only be implemented 
through increased surveillance and monitoring of all EU citizens—
most likely, with an increased focus on economically vulnerable 
groups.  
Freedom of movement is ultimately the freedom to settle, the freedom 
to seek new opportunities, the freedom to choose where and how to 
live one’s life. Individual criminal behaviour can and should be 
punished under the law, but sending an EU citizen ‘home’, should 
perhaps at this point be recognized as oxymoronic. As the EU 
continues to fight its demons, this could be an opportunity to truly 
defend its vision of an integrated community of states and problems, 
and perhaps learn to celebrate the right to both ‘nomadism’ and 
‘settlement’ granted to all of its citizens, including the Roma. 
Perhaps the one positive response to the most recent French 
evacuations will be a rising sense of solidarity with the Roma 
communities within Romania and Bulgaria, that is, if the fear of further 
restrictions to be imposed on all Romanian and Bulgarian citizens will 
not give way to increased resentment. The ‘Roma problem’ is 
ultimately a challenge to the state’s control over rights of ‘settlement’ 
and ‘nomadism’ seeking to disconnect the application of legal rights 
and availability of state services from residence and a particular kind 
of ‘settlement’.  
Conclusion 
Recognizing the ‘Roma problem’ as ultimately a spatial problem in 
which the question of settlement vs. nomadism needs to be debated 
in a way that includes the Roma is essential. This article has argued 
that the fetishizing of Roma nomadism, both in popular culture such 
as film as well as in (post)modern architecture, can lead to potentially 
dangerous assumptions about the Roma who are for the most part 
settled or seek settlement. Current state policies that focus on either 
forced settlement or forced displacement of the Roma population fail 
to understand the importance of their having a say in how they 
become visible to the rest of the world. The Roma camps are nothing 
but a sad reminder of the state’s half-hearted attempts to temporarily 
settle a population, in the hope that they will seek a better future 
somewhere else. If Romania and Bulgaria are hoping ‘their’ Roma 
move abroad, their ‘host’ countries are hoping that they would move 
back ‘home’.  
Despite being caught in this loop of constant discrimination the 
wealthier Roma have found ways to assert their presence by settling 
themselves in magical palaces that resemble fairytales. These 
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palaces offer a glimpse of the Roma’s intense desire to be recognized 
on their own terms. While their unique architecture appeals to modern 
architects, these palaces are less permanent than they may appear. 
Crumbling under a weak structure and diminishing funds they may 
soon disappear forcing their owners back into ‘nomadism’. But before 
this happens, the Roma will have at least made a statement about 
their desire, just like everyone else, to be in charge of how and where 
they settle.  
France’s current attempt to displace the Roma communities living in 
camps, following in the footsteps of Italy, exposes important loopholes 
in the EU’s guarantee of freedom of movement legislation, clearly 
singling out economically vulnerable groups such as the Roma and 
limiting not only their freedom of movement but also their right to 
settle. This article argues that attempts to seek EU-wide powers of 
enforcement of the limitations under the freedom of movement law will 
quickly turn into a dangerous monitoring and surveillance mechanism 
that defeats the very moral ground on which the EU claims to stand. 
The ‘Roma problem’ needs to be addressed on spatial terms to 
secure: 1) their right to choose settlement or nomadism; 2) their right 
to choose where to settle and how to make themselves visible; 3) their 
right to receive equal support and protection from their ‘home’ and 
‘host’ states as well as the EU.   
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